Gershen kaufman biography of donald
Skickas inom vardagar. He traces changes in the development of personality in the onset of modern civilization.
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The Power of Focusing by Ann Weiser Cornell — A wonderful, practical book on how to work with what may be the most counter-shaming of all therapy techniques. Very useful for therapists and clients.
Ann also leads phone trainings in Focusing, which, I believe, should be required for every therapist. The Transforming Power of Affect by Diana Fosha — perhaps the best single book on how to do effective therapy, but can be very difficult to read.
My suggestion is to read the case study first, then start from Chapter 2. It is best if you can supplement the book by taking her immersion course. The neurological basis of shame — and its physiological results — very difficult reading, but interesting and convincing.
The Developing Mind by Daniel Siegal. Explores the connection between neurology, childparent affect regulation, attachment theory and adult psychology.
Short, poetic and inspired book on the brain, affect regulation, attachment theory and relationships. Amazingly profound for such a short book.
A good book to suggest to clients. Waking the Tiger by Peter Levine. Incredibly convincing and readable book comparing human and animal behavior to explore the genesis of and treatment of trauma.
Drawing on every theme of the modern life sciences, Donald Nathanson shows how nine basic affects-interest-excitement, enjoyment-joy, surprise-startle, fear-terror, distress-anguish, anger-rage, dissmell, disgust, and shame-humiliation-not only de Explores contemporary affect studies, focusing on the work of Silvan Tomkins, and examining their impact on the theory and practice of psychotherapy. Sections of the book cover research on affect, its theoretical implications and psychiatric thoug It enlarges theoretical perspectives and also enhances clinical skills in ways that are now curiously neglected.
It is my belief that many patients, needful of help, are lost to treatment because the shame factors inherent in this situation have been overlooked. James Anthony, MD "Rich, provocative, and timely, this landmark volume explores the neglected domain of shame. Replete with implications for clinical practice, this book will be indispensable to every practicing clinician A Timetable for shame Chapter 2. The narrowest conceptions are found in vernacular English, orthodox psychoanalytic theory, and experimental social psychology.
The Many Faces of Shame
A broad conception is found in qualitative and micro-linguistic research, and in vernacular usage in traditional societies. It is also implied in theories developed by Mead, Cooley, and Goffman, as discussed below. European languages other than English have two kinds of shame.
In German, for example, there is schande disgrace shame and scham everyday shame. French makes exactly the same distinction, honte and pudeur. With the exception of English, the languages of all modern societies have a word for everyday shame, and another word for disgrace shame. Since English has no word for everyday shame, one cannot discuss shame in English without risking offense.
In this way, English, uniquely among all languages, blocks off a whole area of personhood from discussion. One way around the taboo is rather than referring to shame, to use a softer, less offensive member of the same family of emotions. Goffman took this route. The books that established his reputation imply that embarrassment is the key emotion in social interaction, as Goffman himself stated explicitly in his essay on embarrassment Schudson noted this emphasis but made an issue of it. He complained that although Goffman seemed to be saying that embarrassment is crucially important, he never explained why.
A preliminary attempt to answer this question was offered by Heath Embarrassment lies at the heart of the social organization of day-to-day conduct. It provides a personal constraint on the behavior of the individual in society and a public response to actions and activities considered problematic or untoward.
It permeates everyday life and our dealings with others. Building on the work of earlier theorists, I propose a definition of shame in its broad sense and a theory and method for studying its role in self and society. The first issue to be faced is that shame is both a social and a psychological phenomenon. Mead proposed that the self is a social phenomenon as much as a biological one. This idea is central to the social psychology of Mead, Cooley, and Goffman. Mead himself gave very little attention to shame or any other emotion.
The problem that he attacked was the basis of reflective intelligence. He needed the idea of role taking to explain the origins of intelligence and objectivity.
For Cooleyshame and pride both arose from seeing oneself from the point of view of the other. But his concept of "the looking glass self," which implies the social nature of the self, refers directly and exclusively to pride and shame. Cooley saw self-monitoring in three steps l A self-idea of this sort seems to have three principal elements: In this passage he restricts self-feelings to the two he thought the most significant, pride and shame considering "mortification" to be a shame variant. To make sure we understand this point, he mentions shame three more times in the passage that follows l, emphasis added: The comparison with a looking-glass hardly suggests the second element, the imagined judgment, which is quite essential.
The thing that moves us to pride or shame is not the mere mechanical reflec-tion of ourselves, but an imputed sentiment, the imagined effect of this reflection upon another's mind. This is evident from the fact that the character and weight of that other, in whose mind we see ourselves, makes all the difference with our feeling. We are ashamed to seem evasive in the presence of a straightforward man, cowardly in the presence of a brave one, gross in the eyes of a refined one and so on.
We always imagine, and in imagining share, the judg-ments of the other mind.
The way in which Cooley linked intersubjective connectedness, on the one hand, with pride and shame, on the other, could have been the basis for a general social psychological theory of bond affect. Even though the looking glass self was appreciated and frequently cited in mainstream sociology and social psychology, the part involving pride and shame was simply ignored.
He simply used these words as if their meaning were simple and singular. But in Western societies, the meaning of pride and shame is neither simple nor singular.
The meaning of these words is complex, and laden with emotion. As already indicated, the word shame alone also has negative connotations to the point that it is taboo. Perhaps because he was born in the 19th century, when these words may have been less weighted with feeling, Cooley could have been unaware of the problem. In any case, his insights into the relationship between attunement and emotion were ignored until my review Scheffa hiatus of 68 years.
Goffman also pursued the idea of emotions arising out role taking, but formulated it less directly than Cooley, dealing with embarrassment rather than shame. But more than Cooley, and much more than Mead, Goffman fleshed out the link between embarrassment and role taking by providing many examples ; ; a; These examples allow the reader concrete understanding of ideas that are only abstractions in Mead and Cooley. Goffman also made the key sociological point about embarrassment: Everyone is extremely sensitive to the exact nuance of deference they receive.
This is Goffman's key contribution to emotion knowledge. One piece of the puzzle is suggested by his book Stigma a. Since shame is the central topic of this work, it provided him with ample opportunity to explore the relationship between embarrassment and shame.
But he did not: In the 30 pages of Chapter VIhe mentioned shame or ashamed 4 times, guilt and humiliation once each, and embarrassment 7 times. But this count underplays his consideration of everyday bond affects, because there are many more images that imply them.
One example from the same chapter should be enough to make this point: In this way it is possible for all of us to become fleetingly for ourselves the worst person we can imagine that others might imagine us to be.
Surprisingly, Goffman was not content with only a conceptual definition, but also offered an operational one: An individual may recognize extreme embarrassment in others and even in himself by the objective signs of emotional disturbance: As Mark Baldwin remarked about shyness, there may be "a lowering of the eyes, bowing of the head, putting of hands behind the back, nervous fingering of the clothing or twisting of the fingers together, and stammering, with some incoherence of idea as expressed in speech.
In cases of mild discomfiture, these visible and invisible flusterings occur but in less perceptible form Goffmanemphasis added. This definition links an interior emotion with surface observables. With his usual uncanny instinct, in the last sentence he even seems to hint at the need for further elaboration of the operational definition: The few social science theorists who emphasize emotions seldom define them, even conceptually.
There is no hint of even a conceptual definition in Freud, Cooley, or Simmel His proposition that the threshold for shame is advanced in the civilizing process is the central thread. Yet Elias offered no definition of shame in either book, seeming to assume that the reader would understand the concept of shame in the same way that he did.
The Civilizing Process [TCP] entails an analysis of shame in many excerpts from advice and etiquette manuals in five languages over six centuries.
The analysis of the excerpts is intuitive, and in most cases, inferential. That is, the word shame is sometimes used in the excerpts that he selected, but much more frequently it is not. Elias relied on unexplicated interpretations of cue words and phrases in context. Even if his interpretations were fairly accurate, he still gave little direction to future research on the subject. Unlike Elias and most other analysts of emotion, Goffman took at least the initial step toward overcoming this problem.
What is revealed is a 4 moral inferiority that makes one 5 vulnerable to 6 irresistible forces. As a state of feeling, shame is 7 fearful, 8 chaotic, 9 holistic and 10 humbling. In contrast, Retzinger and I have defined shame broadly. Retzinger also developed a theory of destructive conflict, based on a review of the social science literature on conflict, as well as her own findings.
Our work proposes that shame cannot be understood within an individualistic, asocial framework. Social Definitions of Shame There are also social definitions of shame in maverick psychoanalysis, sociology, and psychology that define shame broadly. This idea was expanded by the sociologist Helen Lyndwhose exposition of the importance of shame to the self and social life is remarkably clear.
Her approach to shame did not test hypotheses, but used concrete examples to clarify the idea of shame.
She was the first to recognize the need for a CONCEPT of shame that would be clearly defined, and that would differentiate it from vernacular usage. Tomkins, who recognized the central role that shame plays in self-process, took the next step. In his volume on the negative affectsV. II he devoted almost pages to a very detailed and comprehensive discussion of shame and humiliation.
Tomkins argued explicitly that embarrassment, shame, and guilt should be recognized as members of a single affect family, as I do here. His idea that has had the most influence is that the seat of the emotions is in the face.
There have been hundreds of studies of the facial expression of emotion. But these studies have contributed little to shame knowledge, for two reasons. It is puzzling that Ekman thought he was following Tomkins, yet ignored the emotion to which Tomkins gave the most attention.
The Ekman et al studies, and those of most of the others who followed their lead, have ignored shame. A second difficulty is that even the facial expression researchers who study shame look at only at still photographs, ignoring context and the sequencing of affects. Her conceptual definition is suggested by one of her schematics. Unlike any other emotion, shame depends only on specific aspects of social relationships. As implied by the table, one can generate any specific bond affect by utilizing one or more of the six dimensions.
A second contribution by Lewis is the idea that shame is inherently a social emotion Her formulation was biopsychosocial. She asserted that human beings are social by biological inheritance.
That is, she implied that shame is an instinct that has the function of signaling threats to the social bond. Just as the instinctual emotion of fear signals danger to life and limb, shame also signals a potential threat to survival, especially for an infant, threat to a social bond.Shame Affect & Compass of Shame - Donald L. Nathanson
In this same vein, Kaufman proposed that shame dynamics are part of the interpersonal bridge that connects individuals who would otherwise lead isolated existences. On the basis of her empirical study of shame in psychotherapy, Lewis contributed to a broad definition of shame by proposing that most shame states seem to be outside of awareness. Her first book on shame was based on an analysis of verbatim transcripts of hundreds of psychotherapy sessions.
Gershen Kaufman, Ph.D.
She encountered shame because she used a systematic method for identifying emotions in verbal transcripts, the Gottschalk-Gleser method ; This method involves long lists of key words that are correlated with specific emotions, such as anger, grief, fear, anxiety, and shame. This method forced Lewis to encounter shame as the dominant emotion in the sessions she analyzed.
She found that anger, fear, grief, and anxiety cues showed up from time to time in the transcripts. What she was unprepared for was the massive frequency of shame cues. The findings from her study most relevant to this article are: Lewis found a high frequency of shame markers in all the sessions, far outranking markers of all other emotions combined. This finding alone suggests that shame was a dominant force in the sessions she analyzed. Even the relatively mild word embarrassment was little used.
In analyzing shame episodes, Lewis identified a specific context: